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OPINION 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
At issue in this appeal is whether Pennsylvania 
inmates have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in 
 3 
 
the expectation of release to a community correctional center. 
We hold they do not.  
I 
Appellant Darryl Powell is a former Pennsylvania state 
inmate whose suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was dismissed by 
the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania. The gravamen of Powell’s complaint was that 
the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) violated 
his Fourteenth Amendment right not to be deprived of liberty 
without due process of law when it revoked its decision to 
release him to a community correctional center. The DOC 
concedes that the revocation was based on an improper 
calculation of Powell’s sentence. 
Most of the prolix details underlying Powell’s 
interactions with the Pennsylvania criminal justice system are 
not germane to the question presented here, so we recite only 
the essential facts.  
In July 2002, Powell was sentenced in three separate 
criminal actions before two judges of the Philadelphia County 
Court of Common Pleas. Thereafter, Powell challenged the 
DOC’s calculation of his overall prison term in the 
Pennsylvania intermediate appellate courts, contending that 
his sentences should run concurrently, not consecutively. 
Powell’s term was then recalculated, and based on that 
recalculation, he was granted prerelease status and scheduled 
for transfer to a community correctional center—an extension 
of the state correctional system designed to reintegrate 
inmates into the community—on February 12, 2007. Appellee 
Ralph Weiss, a DOC employee who was sued in his 
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individual capacity,
1
 processed the paperwork for Powell’s 
transfer, during which time he reviewed Powell’s sentence 
calculation in accordance with standard DOC procedure. As 
part of his review, Weiss sought clarification, and one of the 
judges who presided over Powell’s criminal cases advised 
Weiss by letter dated February 8, 2007—just four days prior 
to Powell’s scheduled transfer—that his sentences were to run 
consecutively. In accordance with this response, Weiss 
recalculated Powell’s overall prison term, which resulted in 
Powell being denied prerelease without notice or a hearing. 
Although Powell eventually was granted prerelease status in 
July 2008 and transferred to a community correctional center, 
he alleged he was deprived of a protected liberty interest 
during the approximately seventeen months that he remained 
incarcerated before his transfer.  
In 2009, Powell filed a petition for writ of mandamus 
in which he asked the Commonwealth Court to compel the 
                                                 
1
 Powell’s complaint named not only Weiss, but also 
DOC employees Diane Yale and John Wetzel, as well as the 
Chairman of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 
Michael Potteiger. All defendants were sued in their 
individual and official capacities. In the District Court, 
Powell conceded that his official capacity claims were barred 
by the Eleventh Amendment to our Constitution. At oral 
argument before us, Powell conceded that, because he failed 
to plead facts that personally implicated Potteiger, Yale, and 
Wetzel, only Weiss’s conduct remained at issue. Tr. at 3, 5; 
see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (holding that 
a claim is plausible only “when the plaintiff pleads factual 
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”). 
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DOC to reduce his prison term by running his three sentences 
concurrently. While that petition was pending, Powell was 
paroled from the DOC’s custody on August 31, 2009. Over a 
year later, in January 2011, the Commonwealth Court issued 
a writ of mandamus after holding that Powell’s trial judge had 
no authority to modify his sentence with her February 8, 
2007, letter to the DOC. See Commonwealth of Pa. ex rel. 
Powell v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 14 A.3d 912, 913–14 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2011). Pursuant to the Commonwealth Court’s 
order, the DOC recalculated Powell’s sentence, which 
resulted in a maximum sentence date of May 22, 2012. This 
recalculation gave rise to Powell’s claim that he was deprived 
of another liberty interest when he was supervised as a 
parolee by the Board of Probation and Parole until December 
2012, some seven months beyond the appropriate date.  
The District Court dismissed Powell’s complaint 
against Weiss for two reasons. First, it held that Weiss’s 
miscalculation of Powell’s sentence did not violate due 
process because Powell had no liberty interest in his 
prerelease status and his anticipated transfer to a community 
correctional facility. Second, although the Court held that 
Powell’s unwarranted parole supervision did deprive him of a 
cognizable liberty interest, it determined sua sponte that this 
claim was precluded by the favorable termination rule of 
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).  
Powell timely appealed. 
 
 
II 
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The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction over its final 
order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
We review the District Court’s dismissal order de 
novo. James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d 
Cir. 2012). In doing so, we “accept all factual allegations as 
true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable 
reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to 
relief.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). 
III 
On appeal, Powell maintains that he had a protected 
liberty interest in his prerelease status and anticipated transfer 
to a community correctional center. Thus, he contends that 
the District Court erred when it held that Weiss’s 
miscalculation—and the subsequent revocation of his 
prerelease status—did not violate his Fourteenth Amendment 
right to due process of law. 
We sympathize with Powell because he was 
understandably disappointed when his anticipated transfer to 
a community correctional center was rescinded through no 
fault of his own. Though Powell pleaded no facts to this 
effect, the parties presume that residents of community 
correctional centers enjoy greater privileges and relaxed 
restrictions compared to those who remain incarcerated in 
state correctional facilities. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
has “reject[ed] . . . the notion that any grievous loss visited 
upon a person by the State is sufficient to invoke the 
procedural protections of the Due Process Clause.” Jago v. 
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Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 17 (1981) (quoting Meachum v. 
Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Instead, our inquiry concerns “not merely the 
‘weight’ of the individual’s interest, but whether the nature of 
the interest is one within the contemplation of the ‘liberty or 
property language of the Fourteenth Amendment.’” Id. 
(quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). 
Protected liberty interests “arise either from the Due Process 
Clause or from state-created statutory entitlement.” Fraise v. 
Terhune, 283 F.3d 506, 522 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Shoats v. 
Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2000)). We have 
characterized the former as an “independent due process 
liberty interest” and the latter as a “state-created liberty 
interest.” Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 325 (3d Cir. 
2010). We shall consider each liberty interest in turn. 
A 
With respect to an inmate’s independent due process 
liberty interest, the Supreme Court has held:  
As long as the conditions or degree of 
confinement to which the prisoner is subjected 
is within the sentence imposed upon him and is 
not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the 
Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an 
inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to 
judicial oversight.  
 
Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976); Asquith v. 
Dep’t of Corr., 186 F.3d 407, 410 (3d Cir. 1999). Thus, due 
process is implicated “when severe changes in conditions of 
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confinement amount to a grievous loss that should not be 
imposed without the opportunity for notice and an adequate 
hearing.” Renchenski, 622 F.3d at 325 (finding that due 
process must be afforded before sex offender conditions may 
be imposed on an inmate who was not convicted of a sexual 
offense); see also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 487 (1980) 
(holding that a prisoner convicted of robbery may not be 
involuntarily transferred to a mental hospital without 
process). Unlike Renchenski and Vitek, here Weiss’s 
administrative error resulted in no change to Powell’s 
conditions of confinement; although Powell had been 
scheduled for transfer, he had not actually been released to 
the community correctional center. Accordingly, he remained 
in confinement in accordance with his sentence. 
On appeal, Powell emphasizes that his case involves 
the revocation, not the mere denial, of his prerelease status, 
and that a protected liberty interest attached once that status 
was granted. Powell’s argument is not without force, as the 
Supreme Court has held that a Fourteenth Amendment 
interest may arise once an inmate is granted a substantial, 
albeit conditional, freedom. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482 
(noting that “the liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, 
includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty” 
entitled to protection by the Fourteenth Amendment). But the 
Supreme Court has also clarified that an inmate’s mere 
anticipation of freedom, when a privilege has been granted 
but not yet implemented, does not give rise to a 
constitutionally recognized liberty interest. Jago, 454 U.S. at 
21–22.  
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decision in Jago, which 
concerned a prison’s revocation of its promise of parole, 
governs our analysis in Powell’s case. There, the inmate had 
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been informed he would be released on parole, and pursuant 
to the parole board’s order, completed prison prerelease 
classes and was measured for civilian clothes. Id. at 14–15. 
Before Jago’s scheduled release, however, the board 
rescinded his parole order without a hearing after learning 
that Jago had been untruthful during his evaluation. Id. at 15. 
In the ensuing suit, Jago claimed that he had a protected 
liberty interest in his anticipated parole because the board’s 
notification had created a “mutually explicit understanding[]” 
of release that was entitled to due process protection. Id. at 16 
(quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) 
(finding that “[a] person’s interest in a benefit is a ‘property’ 
interest for due process purposes if there are such rules or 
mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of 
entitlement to the benefit and that he may invoke at a 
hearing”)). The Supreme Court rejected this argument. It 
ruled that Sindermann’s implied-contract principle was 
“limited to the creation of property interests” under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and that “[s]uch [contract] principles 
do not . . . readily lend themselves to determining the 
existence of constitutionally protected liberty interests in the 
setting of prisoner parole.” Id. at 18. Further, the Court 
reasoned that if an implicit understanding could be sufficient 
to trigger due process protections, it “would severely restrict 
the necessary flexibility of prison administrators and parole 
authorities” in operating penal systems. Id. at 19. 
Accordingly, while Jago had sustained a “grievous loss” upon 
the rescission of his parole, the Court held that his anticipated 
release did not give rise to a liberty interest under the 
Constitution. Id. at 17–18.  
If Jago’s legitimate expectation of parole did not result 
in a cognizable liberty interest, it follows a fortiori that 
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Powell did not have such an interest in his anticipated transfer 
to a community correctional center. Indeed, Jago suffered 
more significant adverse consequences as a result of the 
state’s volte-face than did Powell here. Cf. Evans v. Sec’y Pa. 
Dep’t of Corr., 645 F.3d 650, 664–65 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding, 
after comparing the inmate’s predicament to Jago’s, that he 
had no expectation of release on an erroneously calculated 
date). For Jago, parole offered significant freedoms: “[t]he 
liberty of a parolee enables him to do a wide range of things 
open to persons who have never been convicted of any 
crime.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. Powell, on the other 
hand, concedes that residence in a community correctional 
center often entails fewer liberties than parole. See Powell Br. 
at 9, 11 (noting that the Third Circuit has found no liberty 
interest in retaining certain types of prerelease status after 
comparing the liberties at issue with those of parole). 
Furthermore, Jago had been granted parole from a sentence of 
100 years, so his parole revocation radically changed his 
future from imminent release to life in prison. In contrast, 
Powell alleges that he was deprived of spending seventeen 
months in a less restrictive environment. Indeed, Powell’s 
case is more sympathetic in only one respect: Jago 
contributed to his parole revocation when he lied during his 
evaluation, while Powell is without fault in respect to the 
revocation of his prerelease status. This distinction is 
unavailing to Powell, however, because we have noted that a 
plaintiff’s culpability is irrelevant to the question of whether 
he has a protected liberty interest. See Evans, 645 F.3d at 665 
n.23 (noting that the inmate was “blameless” does not 
“detract from the basic point concerning a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest”). 
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Powell next contends that we cannot evaluate the 
nature of his liberty interest in the abstract. Pointing to our 
decision in Asquith, he argues that courts must consider “the 
specific characteristics of an inmate’s pre-release program 
when determining if a liberty interest is at stake.” Powell Br. 
at 11. He therefore urges us to remand so that he may develop 
the factual record and demonstrate the “type and degree of 
liberty at stake” in his case. Powell Br. at 14. 
In Asquith, the plaintiff was removed from his work 
release program for a purported violation that was found 
invalid; he claimed that the state could not deny his 
reinstatement to the program without a hearing. 186 F.3d at 
409–10. We engaged in a careful, fact-specific inquiry of the 
work release program at issue, concluding that the restrictions 
inherent in the program amounted to “institutional 
confinement.” Id. at 410–11. Because the plaintiff remained 
in institutional confinement as a participant in his specific 
program, we reasoned, he had no liberty interest in that 
privilege. Id. at 411 (citing, inter alia, Meachum, 427 U.S. at 
224–25 (an inmate in institutional confinement has no 
cognizable interest in remaining in a preferred facility within 
the state’s prison system)).  
However, Asquith does not apply to Powell’s case, and 
therefore we see no need for further factual discovery. In 
Asquith, we considered the nature of the inmate’s program 
because he had already participated in it and enjoyed the 
freedoms associated therewith. In contrast, Powell had been 
scheduled for, but not yet transferred to, the community 
correctional center at the time his prerelease status was 
rescinded. Accordingly, it would be inappropriate for us to 
consider his potential liberties in the community correctional 
center when ascertaining the nature of his deprivation. See 
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Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482 n.8 (“It is not sophistic to attach 
greater importance to a person’s justifiable reliance in 
maintaining his conditional freedom . . . than to his mere 
anticipation or hope of freedom.”) (quoting United States ex 
rel. Bey v. Conn. Bd. of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079, 1086 (2d Cir. 
1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted and emphases 
added).
 
 
For the reasons stated, we conclude that Powell did not 
have an independent due process liberty interest in his 
prerelease status and associated transfer. We turn now to 
whether he had a state-created liberty interest.  
B 
In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), the 
Supreme Court held that a prisoner is deprived of a state-
created liberty interest if the deprivation “imposes atypical 
and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the 
ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484; see also Shoats, 
213 F.3d at 143 (adopting Sandin). In this inquiry, we do not 
compare the prisoner’s own life before and after the 
deprivation. Rather, “[t]he baseline for determining what is 
‘atypical and significant’—the ‘ordinary incidents of prison 
life’—is ascertained by what a sentenced inmate may 
reasonably expect to encounter as a result of his or her 
conviction in accordance with due process of law.” Asquith, 
186 F.3d at 412 (quoting Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 
706 & n.2 (3d Cir. 1997)).  
With the loss of his prerelease status, Powell remained 
in prison for the duration of his term—not an “atypical or 
significant hardship” for a convicted criminal. See id. 
(holding that a prisoner had no state-created liberty interest in 
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retaining his prerelease status and remaining in a work release 
program); see also Callender v. Sioux City Residential 
Treatment Facility, 88 F.3d 666, 669 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(revoking an inmate’s prerelease status, removing him from 
work release, and returning him to prison did not deprive him 
of a liberty interest). And while the parties presume that 
Powell would have experienced greater restrictions in the 
general prison population than he would in a community 
correctional center, this did not impose an “atypical and 
significant hardship” relative to the “ordinary incidents of 
prison life.” Cf. Fraise, 283 F.3d at 522 (finding there was no 
deprivation when an inmate was transferred from a low-
security to high-security correctional facility). 
Powell relies on United States ex rel. Flores v. Cuyler, 
511 F. Supp. 386 (E.D. Pa. 1981), to contend that his status 
gave him a state-created “quantum of liberty” protected by 
due process. Id. at 390. The district court in Flores held that 
the revocation of an inmate’s prerelease status constituted a 
deprivation of liberty, as he “lost something when he was 
suspended from [his] status: eligibility to be considered for 
home furloughs.” Id. “That eligibility represented some 
quantum of liberty, and though the quantum may have been 
small, it was entitled to due process protection.” Id. Powell 
claims that his case is analogous to Flores, as the prison 
rescinded his eligibility for transfer to the community 
correctional center after his prerelease status had been 
granted.  
Flores built on our decision in Winsett v. McGinnes, 
617 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1980), in which we held that a 
discretionary program—not unlike the prerelease status 
sought by Powell—could give rise to a protected liberty 
interest if state law or regulations articulated specific criteria 
 14 
 
for participation. Id. at 1007. Our decision followed 
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional 
Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), which instructed that the 
existence of a state-created liberty interest was a “case-by-
case” inquiry that depended on whether the statute creating 
the privilege limited the state’s discretion in granting the 
privilege. Id. at 12. Thus, while a state was not obligated to 
create a discretionary program, its use of binding 
requirements to administer that program resulted in a 
protected liberty interest. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 
472 (1983) (relying on Greenholtz to hold that “mandatory 
language” in the relevant statute is an important factor in 
finding a liberty interest).  
In Winsett, an inmate in the Delaware correctional 
system had met the eligibility criteria for the state’s work 
release program; nonetheless, the prison refused to grant him 
work release status because it feared that his release would 
result in public outcry. 617 F.2d at 1000. We held that 
Delaware, by promulgating specific standards for the 
administration of its work release program, had created a 
protectible liberty interest in participation by inmates who 
had met those criteria. Id. at 1006–07. It therefore followed 
that the prison’s consideration of other impermissible factors 
in denying the inmate’s application for work release violated 
his due process rights. Id. at 1007. Flores expanded on 
Winsett’s holding: if Winsett found that a due process 
violation existed when an inmate sought to obtain prerelease 
status, the district court reasoned, then the facts in Flores’s 
case “more strongly favor[ed] a finding of a protectible 
liberty interest.” 511 F. Supp. at 390. Indeed, “Flores [was] 
not claiming that he was entitled to due process when he 
applied for pre-release status but rather that he was entitled to 
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due process when he was suspended from that status.” Id. 
(emphasis added).  
In our view, Powell’s reliance on Flores is problematic 
because Winsett and its progeny are no longer good law. In 
Sandin, the Supreme Court clarified its standard for finding a 
state-created liberty interest, rejecting the “case-by-case 
approach” espoused by Greenholtz and its progeny. See 
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 481–82. The Supreme Court noted that 
Greenholtz’s approach required courts to delve into the 
minutiae of prison regulations and search for mandatory 
language that would entitle inmates to state-conferred 
privileges—a task that “strayed from the real concerns 
undergirding the liberty protected by the Due Process 
Clause.” Id. at 483 (citing Hewitt and Greenholtz as 
examples). This produced two “undesirable effects.” Id. at 
482. First, Greenholtz discouraged the state from codifying 
prison procedures that served the worthwhile function of 
guiding subordinate employees in their exercise of the 
warden’s discretion. Id. Second, this approach required 
federal courts to scrutinize the “day-to-day management of 
prisons,” undermining the Court’s expressed interest in 
“afford[ing] appropriate deference and flexibility to state 
officials trying to manage a volatile [prison] environment.” 
Id. The Court thus articulated the standard we apply here: 
state-created liberty interests are “limited to freedom from 
restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant hardship 
on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison 
life.” Id. at 484. We adopted this test in Shoats, recognizing 
that Sandin “announced a new standard for determining 
whether prison conditions deprive a prisoner of a liberty 
interest that is protected by procedural due process 
guarantees.” Shoats, 213 F.3d at 143 (emphasis added). 
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Because Winsett—and by extension, Flores—rested on 
Greenholtz’s now-discredited approach, it, too, cannot stand. 
Thus, to the extent Powell likens his case to Flores, it does 
not advance his cause.
2
  
For these reasons, Powell has neither an independent 
due process nor a state-created liberty interest in his revoked 
prerelease status and transfer. Weiss’s miscalculation, 
therefore, did not deprive Powell of a Fourteenth Amendment 
right.  
IV 
Powell also contends that he was deprived of a 
protected liberty interest when he was supervised on parole 
seven months past his maximum sentence date, and that the 
                                                 
2
 We also note that Powell could not have claimed 
entitlement to a state-created liberty interest even under the 
Greenholtz case-by-case framework. Unlike the Delaware 
program in Winsett, Pennsylvania law provides no guarantee 
that an inmate’s prerelease status will not be revoked. Under 
the relevant statute, “[i]f any inmate violates the rules or 
regulations prescribed by the [B]ureau [of Corrections], his 
release privileges may be withdrawn.” 61 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
1053. The implementing regulation in turn provides that an 
“inmate’s privilege to participate in pre-release programs may 
be suspended or revoked for administrative or disciplinary 
reasons.” 37 Pa. Code § 94.3(a)(10). Powell’s status was 
revoked for an administrative, albeit erroneous, reason: the 
DOC recalculated his sentence in accordance with routine 
operating procedures and, based on that miscalculation, found 
that he was no longer eligible for prerelease. 
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District Court, while recognizing that interest, erred in finding 
that his claim was barred by Heck v. Humphrey. 
Under Heck, inmates cannot state a claim under 
section 1983 unless their “conviction or sentence has been 
reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, 
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a 
determination, or called into question by a federal court’s 
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” 512 U.S. at 487. This 
rule applies if “success in [the] action would necessarily 
demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” 
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005). But Powell’s 
claim for wrongful supervision does not constitute a collateral 
attack against his sentence. Powell has successfully 
challenged the duration of his sentence in the Commonwealth 
Court, which in January 2011 held that the DOC had 
miscalculated his term. See Powell, 14 A.3d at 913–14. His 
civil rights claim, therefore, cannot be dismissed pursuant to 
Heck because his sentence was invalidated by an appropriate 
state tribunal. See 512 U.S. at 487. 
We can, however, affirm for any reason supported by 
the record, see Guthrie v. Lady Jane Collieries, Inc., 722 F.2d 
1141, 1145 n.1 (3d Cir. 1983), and the record demonstrates 
that Weiss had no involvement in Powell’s supervision on 
parole. The Board of Probation and Parole, not the DOC, has 
exclusive authority over parole supervision. See 61 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 6132. Because Powell asserted a claim only against 
Weiss, an employee of the DOC, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order dismissing the wrongful supervision claim. 
* * * 
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For the reasons stated herein, we hold that Powell 
failed to state a claim for violation of his constitutional right 
to due process because he had no cognizable liberty interest 
in his anticipated release to a community correctional center. 
Nor did Powell state a claim against an appropriate employee 
of the Board of Probation and Parole in respect to his claim 
for wrongful parole supervision. Accordingly, we will affirm 
the order of the District Court dismissing Powell’s complaint. 
